Sponk
2020-06-30T04:15:51+00:00
Is the global monetary order ready for another reboot?
全球货币秩序是否已准备好再次启动?
In the 1960s, Japan and Europe exported their way to post-World War II prosperity under the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods agreement. The US went off the gold standard in 1971, but the established way of doing things didn’t collapse. Thirty years later, China essayed the role of being the world economy’s periphery and selling cheap widgets to a revamped core — the West and Japan — with the help of an undervalued exchange rate.
在20世纪60年代，日本和欧洲凭借布雷顿森林协定的固定汇率下实现了二战后的繁荣。美国在1971年退出金本位制，但既定的行事方式并没有崩溃。30年后，中国尝试扮演世界经济边缘的角色，并在低估汇率的帮助下，向转型后的核心国家——西方和日本出售廉价商品。
This, as economists Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter M. Garber noted in an influential 2003 essay, was Bretton Woods revived. The “China phase,” they said, would play out over 10 to 20 years as the world economy absorbed 200 million surplus rural Chinese workers at the rate of 10 million to 20 million a year. To that end, Beijing would acquire vast quantities of foreign-exchange reserves regardless of cost. And when China was done, India would take its place. Will it?
正如经济学家迈克尔?P?杜利、戴维?福克茨-兰道和彼得?M?加伯在2003年一篇颇具影响力的文章中指出的那样，这是布雷顿森林体系的复兴。他们说，随着世界经济以每年1000万到2000万的速度吸收2亿中国农村剩余劳动力，“中国时期”将持续10到20年。为此，北京将不计代价获取大量外汇储备。当中国时期结束时，印度将取代其位置，印度能吗?
One clue may lie in official reserves. By purchasing the public debt of a profligate center, a hardworking fringe signals its reliability; any threat to Western business investments, and the periphery’s holdings of U.S. Treasuries and other safe assets could get cancelled
官方储备可能是一条线索。通过购买一个挥霍无度的中心国家的公共债务，勤劳的边缘国家表明了其可靠性，如果对西方商业投资造成威胁，外围国家持有的美国国债和其他安全资产都可能被取消。
By the time Dooley et al got down to writing, “The Revived Bretton Woods System’s First Decade” in 2014, China’s reserves were peaking, at about $4 trillion, from under $300 billion at the time of their original study. Just recently, India’s foreign-exchange stockpile crossed the $500 billion mark. In 1990, the country only had enough dollars to pay foreign suppliers for half a month. Now the reserves cover two years of imports.
2014年，当杜利等人开始撰写《布雷顿森林体系复兴的第一个十年》时，中国的外汇储备已经从他们最初开始研究时的不到3000亿美元，达到了约4万亿美元的峰值。就在最近，印度的外汇储备突破了5000亿美元大关。1990年，该国储备的美元仅够支付外国供应商半个月的费用，而目前的外汇储备可以满足两年的进口需求。
Yet the domestic political discourse is harking back to a protectionist past. Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants self-reliance. Other officials are coaxing Indians to buy local even if means paying more. It doesn’t look like India sees itself as the world’s next factory, which requires openness. Emboldened by its recent free trade agreement with the European Union, Vietnam may be more suited to playing that role, even though the Southeast Asian nation of fewer than 100 million people lacks India’s labour power.
然而，国内政治论调重提保护主义。印度总理纳伦德拉?莫迪希望实现自力更生。其他官正在劝导印度人购买本地产品，即使这意味着要花更多的钱。印度似乎并不认为自己是下一个世界工厂，成为世界工厂需要开放。越南最近与欧盟达成了自游贸易协议，受到鼓舞，越南可能更适合扮演“世界工厂”这一角色，尽管这个人口不足1亿的东南亚国家缺乏印度那种规模的劳动力。
Some of India’s retreat may be tactical and temporary. The U.S. is still coping with China’s rise, and not in a mood to let another 200 million workers latch on to its customers. Industrialization of the periphery requires a fundamental restructuring of the labour force in the core, as the authors of Bretton Woods 2.0 warned. “No country has found a workable way to compensate its own losers.”
印度的部分退避可能是战术上的，也可能是暂时的。美国仍在应对中国的崛起，没有心情再让2亿工人依附其客户。正如《布雷顿森林体系2.0》的作者所警告的那样，外围国家的工业化会对核心国家的劳动力进行根本重组，没有一个国家找到一种可行的方法来补偿输家。
The Western companies that chose China as a manufacturing location became vocal supporters of its developmental strategy and shielded it from politicians and labour unions in their home countries.
选择中国作为制造基地的西方企业，成为了中国发展战略的坚定支持者，并保护中国不受本国政客和工会的打压。
India has its own constraints. After its Himalayan border with China witnessed the deadliest conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbours in 45 years, there’s litt
全球货币秩序是否已准备好再次启动?
In the 1960s, Japan and Europe exported their way to post-World War II prosperity under the fixed exchange rates of the Bretton Woods agreement. The US went off the gold standard in 1971, but the established way of doing things didn’t collapse. Thirty years later, China essayed the role of being the world economy’s periphery and selling cheap widgets to a revamped core — the West and Japan — with the help of an undervalued exchange rate.
在20世纪60年代，日本和欧洲凭借布雷顿森林协定的固定汇率下实现了二战后的繁荣。美国在1971年退出金本位制，但既定的行事方式并没有崩溃。30年后，中国尝试扮演世界经济边缘的角色，并在低估汇率的帮助下，向转型后的核心国家——西方和日本出售廉价商品。
This, as economists Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau and Peter M. Garber noted in an influential 2003 essay, was Bretton Woods revived. The “China phase,” they said, would play out over 10 to 20 years as the world economy absorbed 200 million surplus rural Chinese workers at the rate of 10 million to 20 million a year. To that end, Beijing would acquire vast quantities of foreign-exchange reserves regardless of cost. And when China was done, India would take its place. Will it?
正如经济学家迈克尔?P?杜利、戴维?福克茨-兰道和彼得?M?加伯在2003年一篇颇具影响力的文章中指出的那样，这是布雷顿森林体系的复兴。他们说，随着世界经济以每年1000万到2000万的速度吸收2亿中国农村剩余劳动力，“中国时期”将持续10到20年。为此，北京将不计代价获取大量外汇储备。当中国时期结束时，印度将取代其位置，印度能吗?
One clue may lie in official reserves. By purchasing the public debt of a profligate center, a hardworking fringe signals its reliability; any threat to Western business investments, and the periphery’s holdings of U.S. Treasuries and other safe assets could get cancelled
官方储备可能是一条线索。通过购买一个挥霍无度的中心国家的公共债务，勤劳的边缘国家表明了其可靠性，如果对西方商业投资造成威胁，外围国家持有的美国国债和其他安全资产都可能被取消。
By the time Dooley et al got down to writing, “The Revived Bretton Woods System’s First Decade” in 2014, China’s reserves were peaking, at about $4 trillion, from under $300 billion at the time of their original study. Just recently, India’s foreign-exchange stockpile crossed the $500 billion mark. In 1990, the country only had enough dollars to pay foreign suppliers for half a month. Now the reserves cover two years of imports.
2014年，当杜利等人开始撰写《布雷顿森林体系复兴的第一个十年》时，中国的外汇储备已经从他们最初开始研究时的不到3000亿美元，达到了约4万亿美元的峰值。就在最近，印度的外汇储备突破了5000亿美元大关。1990年，该国储备的美元仅够支付外国供应商半个月的费用，而目前的外汇储备可以满足两年的进口需求。
Yet the domestic political discourse is harking back to a protectionist past. Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants self-reliance. Other officials are coaxing Indians to buy local even if means paying more. It doesn’t look like India sees itself as the world’s next factory, which requires openness. Emboldened by its recent free trade agreement with the European Union, Vietnam may be more suited to playing that role, even though the Southeast Asian nation of fewer than 100 million people lacks India’s labour power.
然而，国内政治论调重提保护主义。印度总理纳伦德拉?莫迪希望实现自力更生。其他官正在劝导印度人购买本地产品，即使这意味着要花更多的钱。印度似乎并不认为自己是下一个世界工厂，成为世界工厂需要开放。越南最近与欧盟达成了自游贸易协议，受到鼓舞，越南可能更适合扮演“世界工厂”这一角色，尽管这个人口不足1亿的东南亚国家缺乏印度那种规模的劳动力。
Some of India’s retreat may be tactical and temporary. The U.S. is still coping with China’s rise, and not in a mood to let another 200 million workers latch on to its customers. Industrialization of the periphery requires a fundamental restructuring of the labour force in the core, as the authors of Bretton Woods 2.0 warned. “No country has found a workable way to compensate its own losers.”
印度的部分退避可能是战术上的，也可能是暂时的。美国仍在应对中国的崛起，没有心情再让2亿工人依附其客户。正如《布雷顿森林体系2.0》的作者所警告的那样，外围国家的工业化会对核心国家的劳动力进行根本重组，没有一个国家找到一种可行的方法来补偿输家。
The Western companies that chose China as a manufacturing location became vocal supporters of its developmental strategy and shielded it from politicians and labour unions in their home countries.
选择中国作为制造基地的西方企业，成为了中国发展战略的坚定支持者，并保护中国不受本国政客和工会的打压。
India has its own constraints. After its Himalayan border with China witnessed the deadliest conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbours in 45 years, there’s litt